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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLIFTON J. HACKFORD, SHARON
HACKFORD, RANDOLPH G.
HACKFORD, and SANDRA H. ASAY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

-vALBERT LEO SNOW and
CORWIN BARTON SNOW,
Defendants/Respondents.

Case No. 17067

ALBERT LEO SNOW,
Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant,

-vCLIFTON J. HACKFORD, et al.,
Defendants/CrossRespondents.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS AND
DEFENDANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves two actions consolidated
for trial:

An action by plaintiffs/appellants (herein-

after "appellants") against defendants/respondents
(hereinafter "respondents") for unlawful detainer, and
an action by respondents against appellants for specific

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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performance of a lease agreement and option to purchase
certain properties which are the subject of both actions.
DISPOSTION IN THE LOWER COURT
On the 12th day of February,

1980, Kenneth

E. Anderton, sitting by designation as a Judge of
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah, entered a judgment dismissing appellant's
Complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents
and granting judgment for respondents on their Complaint
for specific performance of a lease and option agreement
of the parties, and awarded damages and costs to appellants and respondents on the various claims and counterclaims at issue in each action.
On the

7th day of

April,

1980, the lower

court entered a further order amending the judgment
in several particulars.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have this Court reverse
the findings and judgment of the lower court, and
specifically, to find and declare that appellants
are entitled to judgment against respondents for their
unlawful detainer upon appellants' lands, and that

-2-
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respondents are not entitled to a judgment for specific
performance of the lease and option agreement of the
parties, and to assess damages and costs against respondents according to the evidence adduced at trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In April, 1975, appellant Clifton J. Hackford
and respondent Corwin Barton Snow negotiated an Agreement wherebyrespondents were to lease and have an
option to purchase certain lands owned by all appellants and described in the Agreement as:

''Neola,

(420 acre Hackford farm), Uintah County, State of
Utah."

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 4).

None of the

other appellants or respondent Leo Snow participated
in any of the negotiations regarding the Agreement
and each signed the Agreement at different times prior
to its execution by appellant Clifton J. Hackford
and respondent Corwin Barton Snow.

(Tr. Vol. I, pp.

10-13, 20-21, 106, 122-123).
The Agreement was drawn on a standard Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer To Lease form by Sherman Culp,
a real estate agent and friend of respondent Corwin
Barton Snow, at his instance and request (Tr. Vol.

-3-
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I,

p. 39) .

Appellant Clifton J. Hackford was a married
man at the time of the Agreement and the name of his
wife, Sharon Hackford, appears on one of the two original
drafts of the Agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 and
4).

However, Sharon Hackford testified that she never

signed the Agreement and respondent Corwin Barton
Snow testified that he was aware that she had not
signed the Agreement (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 21-22, 128-130;
49).

Although the Agreement provides on its face
(lines 36-38) that appellants and respondents agreed
to execute "a written lease which will supercede and
abrogate this agreement" "within 10 days after tender
of a firm lease prepared by the landlord in a form
consistent with the above provisions and containing
other customary and reasonable general provisions"
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 4), the parties never
executed a formal written lease.
The 420 acres subject to the Agreement was
part of a larger tract of approximately 640 acres
comprising the Hackford farm (Tr. Vol. I, p. 52; De-

-4-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendants• Exhibit 6).

At the time the Agreement was

made, approximately 555 acres of the farm were involved
in an action styled Pumper's Inc. v. Clifton K. Hackford,
et al., Civil No. 7180, pending in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Uintah County, State of Utah.

This

was an action to partition the lands in question between
Pumper's, which had purchased an interest in the land,
and Clifton Kermit Hackford, Randolph G. Hackford
and Sandra Hackford Asay, appellants herein (Tr. Vol.
I, p. 32 ; Defendants Exhibit 6).

An additional 85

acres not at issue in the Pumper's case but referred
to in the Decree therein was owned by appellant Clifton

J. Hackford in his own right (Tr. Vol. I, 22-23, 26;
Defendants' Exhibits 6 and 7).
At the time of the negotiation of the Agreement,
appellant Clifton J. Hackford was not certain that
appellants would retain more than 445 acres of the
Hackford farm as a result of the Pumper's litigation
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 30, 52).

Appellants therefore deter-

mined to lease 420 acres of the 445 to respondents
and to retain a five acre parcel surrounding appellant
Clifton J. Hackford's home and 20 acres of hay ground

-5-
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(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 69, 108, 113).

Appellant Clifton

J. Hackford testified that during the negotiation
of the Agreement he indicated to respondent Corwin
Barton Snow that appellants might retain their 20
acres of hay ground near the five acre parcel surrounding
his home, but that he could not make a final decision
as to where appellants would retain their 20 acres
of hay ground without consulting with the other appellants, each of whom lived some distance from him (Tr.
Vol. I, pp. 69, 98-99, 105, 108, 117).

The Agreement

contains no reference or description of the 25 acres
of land retained by appellants which were not subject
to the Agreement of April, 1975 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 41,46).
Appellants Clifton Kermit Hackford, Randolph
G. Hackford and Sandra Hackford Asay, each testified
that they did not discuss or determine where they
would retain the 20 acres of hay ground until some
time after the Agreement was signed.

At that time,

they determined to reserve the 20 acres of hay ground
in the southeast of the southwest section where the
oil well is now located (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 17, 120-121,
124; Defendants' Exhibit 5-20 acre section labeled
"NOT IN CONTRACT").
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Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that
during 1975 and 1976, he and respondent Corwin Barton
Snow entered into a verbal agreement whereby respondent
Corwin Barton Snow was permitted to take hay from
the 20 acres of appellants' hay ground not subject
to the Agreement of April, 1975, in exchange for providing a certain amount of hay to appellants for their
livestock, and based on respondent Snow's agreement
to pay the taxes and assessments on appellant's hay
ground (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 99-100, 154).

Respondent

Corwin Barton Snow acknowledged the existence of these
verbal agreements with appellant Clifton J. Hackford,
but stated that he believed that the verbal agreements
related to 20 acres of land near appellant Clifton

J. Hackford's home.

On cross-examination, however,

respondent Corwin Barton Snow admitted that there
was not 20 acres of hay adjacent to appellant Hackford's
home and that he stacked the hay he removed from the
property purusant to the verbal agreement down by
the oil well where appellants claim they retained
their 20 acres of hay ground (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 48-49).
In the fall of 1975, appellant Clifton J. Hackford
constructed fences around appellants' 20 acres of
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hay ground not subject to the Agreement of April,
1975 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 74).
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that
he did not see respondent Corwin Barton Snow on the
Hackford farm after the Fall of 1976, and that the
parties had no verbal agreement with respect to respondent's use of hay from appellant's hay ground
after 1976 (Tr. Vol., p. 84, 95, 99-100).
On January 25, 1977, appellants and their
respective spouses entered into an Oil and Gas Lease
with Flying Diamond Oil Corporation (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
12) and an oil well was erected on appellants' 20 acres
of hay ground not subject to the Agreement of April,
1975 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 70, 100).

At no time during

or subsequent to the construction of the oil well
did either of the respondents assert any claim that
the well was constructed on land subject to the Agreement in April, 1975, or take any legal action to contest
the construction of the well (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 70-71).
Mr. Leslie Brown, who was employed to take readings
on the well's activity during June and July, 1977,
and was at the well during every other sixteen hour
period throughout those two months, testified that
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on no occasion did either of respondents ever claim
that "the well was constructed on property subject
to the Agreement of April, 1975, or undertake legal
action to eject him or the oil company from the property
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 191-193).
Marvin Huber, a hired hand, testified that
he cut hay on appellants' hay ground during both the
"first" and "second" cuttings of 1977 an::i was paid for his
work by appellant Clifton J. Hackford.

Mr. Huber

testified that he cut hay on other parts of the Hackford
farm during 1977 and was paid for this work by respondent Leo Snow (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 87, 150-151, 153).
Johnnie Reber, another hired hand, testified that
he bailed hay on appellants' hay ground during the
"third" cutting in August, 1977, and was paid for
his work by appellant Clifton J. Hackford.

Appellant

Clifton Kermit Hackford cut the hay on appellants'
hay ground in August, 1977 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 156-157,
161).

At no time on any of these occasions did either

of respondents claim that the hay removed from appellants'
hay ground was subject to the Agreement of April,
1975 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 265-266).
Pursuant to the Agreement of April, 1975,
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respondents, as tenants, agreed to pay "Real Property
Tax" and any "Increase above 1974 Real Property Tax"
and to "maintain the fences and property water system"
on the property subject of the Agreement (Plaintiffs'
Exhibits 1 and 4).
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that
water assessments were due on April 1 of each year
and that he so advised respondent Corwin Barton Snow
at the time the Agreement was negotiated (Tr. Vol.
I, p. 73).

In 1975, the water assessment was paid

a month late and then was only paid after appellants
made several telephone calls to respondent Corwin
Barton Snow to obtain payment of the assessment (Tr.
Vol. I, pp. 73-74; Defendants' Exhibits 13 and 14).
In 1976, appellant Clifton J. Hackford mended
the fences on the property and telephoned.respondent
Corwin Barton Snow and reminded him of respondents'
obligation to maintain the fences on the property
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 75).
Although appellants Clifton J. Hackford and
Clifton Kermit Hackford made numerous requests and
demands of respondents, respondents failed and refused
to pay the 1976 water assessments which remained due

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and delinquent as of February of 1977 (Tr. Vol. I,
P· 75; Defendants' Exhibit 13; Plaintiffs' Exhibit
14).

At that time, appellant Clifton J. Hackford

received a notice from the Uintah and Ouray Indian
Agency, United States Department of the Interior,
that he would receive no further water during 1977
until the assessment for 1976 was paid (Defendants'
Exhibit No. 8; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 75-76).

Thereafter,

respondent Leo Snow finally paid the 1976 water assessment but appellant Clifton J. Hackford was billed
penalty charges and interest on the 1976 water assessment which he was forced to pay in order to obtain
water for his property during the 1977 irrigation
session· (Defendants' Exhibit 9; Tr. Vol. I, p. 143).
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford also testified
that respondents failed to pay the property taxes
on the 420 acres subject of the lease agreement when
the taxes fell due on November, 1976.

Finally, the

taxes were advertised as delinquent in a local newspaper
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 78).
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that
on or about April 17, 1977, respondent Leo Snow came
to the Hackford farm to make the annual lease payment.
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Clifton J. Hackford and his son, appellant Clifton
Kermit Hackford, informed respondent Leo Snow that
the water assessment for 1977 had not been paid, and
that they were going to terminate the Agreement of
April, 1975, for respondents repeated breach thereof
in failing to make timely payments of the property
taxes and water assessments on the property subject
to the Agreement (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 80-81).

Respondent

Leo Snow then promised appellants that if they would
accept the annual lease payment, that he would keep
up his obligations under the Agreement and pay the
outstanding water assessments for 1977 together with
the interest thereon within three (3) days.

Appellants

agreed to accept the annual lease payment from respondent Snow only on the condition that he follow through
on his representations that he would perform his obligations under the Agreement (Id.).
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that
at the time he accepted the 1977 lease payment from
respondent Leo Snow in April, 1977, that respondent
Snow asked him to take a water turn on the leased
property in May, 1977 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 82).

When appel-

lant Hackford went to the head ditch to release the
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water in May, 1977, he was unable to take the water
turn because respondents had permitted the ditches
to become filled with so much dirt and debris during
the Fall of 1976, that the spring run off in 1977
simply washed over the ditch and created large gullies
and washouts over a large area of appellants' property
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 83).

Appellant Hackford telephoned

Sheriff Kenneth P. Pickup, who took several photographs
of the washouts and gullies (Defendants' Exhibit 15;
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 83, 159).
After discovering

the extensive erosion and

damage to appellants' land, appellant Clifton J. Hackford
telephoned respondent Leo Snow and informed him that
respondents' failure to maintain the ditches on the
property had resulted in extreme damage to appellants'
land and that appellants were going to terminate the
Agreement of April, 1975 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 211-212).
Respondent Leo Snow promised that he would have the
ditches cleaned but did nothing in this regard.

Finally,

appellant Clifton J. Hackford cleaned the ditches
himself (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 83-34).
Following appellants' acceptance of the annual
lease

~ayment

from respondent Leo Snow in April, 1977,
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upon his promise to pay the outstanding water assessments and interest thereon within three days, respondent
Leo Snow did not pay the 1977 water assessment within
three days, or thereafter, although he continued to
promise appellants that he would do so (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 108-109).
In June, 1977, appellant Clifton J. Hackford
was contacted

by one Sonny Grand of the Uintah and

Ouray Irrigation Office and advised that unless 1977
water assessments were paid, that appellants would
not receive any water on their property after July
1, 1977 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 81-82).

Since appellant

Hackford had been watering the hay on appellants'
20 acres not subject to the Agreement of April, 1975,
and growing a garden on the five acre parcel surrounding
his house, he could not afford to lose the water rights
based upon respondents' continued non-payment (Tr.
Vol. I, pp. 80-82; Defendants' Exhibit 10).

Therefore,

appellant Clifton J. Hackford contacted all of the
other appellants and collected the money to pay the
1977 water assessment which he paid on June 30, 1977
(Id.).

Respondent Leo Snow admitted that he never

paid the 1977 water assessment despite his repeated
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promises to do so (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 212-213).
On July 7, 1977, appellants directed Albert
Colton, an attorney in Vernal, Utah, to formally notify
respondents of the termination of the Agreement of
April, 1975, for their continued and notorious breaches
thereof and attorney Colton

sent a letter to respondents

so advising them on the same date (Tr. Vol. I, pp.
84-85; Defendants' Exhibit 11).
On July 15, 1977, respondent Leo Snow and
his attorney, John Beaslin, appeared at the home of
appellant Clifton J. Hackford and attempted to persuade
appellant to accept a check for the 1977 water assessments that appellants had been forced to pay.

On

the same occasion, attorney Beaslin informed appellant
Clifton J. Hackford that respondents were prepared
to pay appellants the full purchase price, but neither
respondent Snow nor Mr. Beaslin attempted to tender
payment at that time (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 85-86, 158).
On this occasion, appellant Clifton J. Hackford led
respondent Leo Snow and attorney Beaslin down through
the fields and indicated the extensive washouts and
gullies that had been created as a result of respondent's
failure to maintain the ditches, and further indicated

-15-
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that respondents' failure to pay the water assessments
and taxes had created considerable hardship to the
appellants, and that, considering that respondents
had continued to breach the parties' Agreement, that
appellants had terminated the lease and would accept
no further payments from respondents (Id.).
Subsequent to the formal termination of the
Agreement by the letter of July 7, 1977, respondent
Leo Snow entered and trespassed upon appellants' lands
and removed hay therefrom (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 87-88).
Following this incident, appellants served respondent
Leo Snow with a further Notice of Termination of Lease
Agreement and Notice of Eviction and Requirement to
Vacate Premises Within Three Days (R. 7-8; Tr. Vol.
I, pp. 223-225; Defendants' Exhibit 17).
On October 17, 1977, respondent Leo Snow filed
a Complaint in the Fourth Judicial District Court
seeking specific performance of the lease and option
provisions of the Agreement of April, 1975 (R. 50-54).
On February 6, 1978, appellants filed an action
for Unlawful Detainer and other damages against respondents
R.

1-9).
On April 11, 1978, a pretrial conference was
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/

held in reference to both actions.

on that occasion.

respondents filed a tender offer for the full purchase
price of the property with the Court (R. 78-79}.

At

the conference, respondents represented to the Court
that there should be a temporary order with respect
to temporary possession of the land and stated that
respondent Leo Snow had farmed the property for three
years.

Appellants argued that Leo Snow had never

farmed the property and that his lease thereof had
been cancelled for breach thereof and that respondents
had been evicted.

Following this exchange, the Court,

per Judge J. Robert Bullock stated "I'm not about
to upset the status quo with an order unless I hear
testimony and evidence and so on."

(See Transcript

of Pretrial Hearing, pp. 14-16, contained in an envelope
at R. 227).
Subsequent to the pretrial conference, the
Court entered an order consolidating the parties'
actions but entered no Order with respect to which
of the parties should have possession of the property
subject of the Agreement pending the trial, or respecting
the right of either party to use irrigation waters
on the lands (Id.).
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On April 17, 1978, respondents' counsel, without
filing any Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
or Preliminary Injunction in the district court, and
without notice to appellants' counsel as required
pursuant to Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
arranged a telephone call with Judge J. Robert Bullock,
during the course of which His Honor entered an Order
in the nature of a Preliminary Injunction granting
respondents possession of the property subject to
the Agreement of April, 1975, pending trial (R. 91-92).
During this conversation there was absolutely no discussion of the right of either party to pay legal
assessments for the use of water on the premises during
the pendency of the parties' actions (R. 17-28).
On May 9, without filing any proper

Motion

for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injuction, and without notice to appellants' counsel or
the opportunity for hearing required pursuant to Rule
65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respondents'
counsel, John

c.

Beaslin, obtained an ex parte order

from the Fourth Judicial District Court, per Judge
David Sam, ordering that appellant Clifton J. Hackford
"be t~mporarily restrained from interfering with the
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use by plaintiff of irrigation water belonging to
and used upon the lands which are the subject of this
action.

It is the intent of the Court that plaintiff

be allowed the use of the water as well as the land
as heretofore ordered by this Court until further
order of this Court" (R. 87-88).

This order also

required appellant Clifton J. Hackford to appear and
show cause"why he should not be held in contempt of
court for willfully interfering with plaintiff's possession
of the lands contrary to the terms of the Order issued
at the hearing on April 17" (R. 87-88).
On or after May 9, 1978, without any notice
to appellants or their counsel, respondent Leo Snow
delivered a copy of the Order of May 9, 1978, to officials
of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Agency, and demanded
under authority thereof, the right to pay the 1978
water assessments, which appellant Clifton J. Hackford
had previously refused to accept from respondent Snow
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 95-96, 225-229, 268).

The May 9 Order

on its face shows that it gave respondent Leo Snow
no authority or right to make the water assessment
payments regarding the water rights of appellant Clifton
J. Hackford (R. 87-88).
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On the occasion that appellant Clifton J. Hackford
appeared before Judge David Sam on the Order To Show
C.ause contained in the Order of May 9, 1978, the contempt
charge against appellant Clifton J. Hackford was dismissed
and Judge Sam vacated his order of May 9, 1978, and
reserved the costs and attorney's fees to be assessed
against respondents until the time of trial (R. 101).
On June 21, 1978, appellant Clifton J. Hackford
hired Marvin Huber to cut the hay on appellants' 20
acres of hay ground not subject to the Agreement of
April, 1975.

When Mr. Huber attempted to cut the

hay, respondent Leo Snow informed Mr. Huber that he
would have him arrested if he attempted to cut the
hay (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 89-90, 151-152, 185-192).
On July 22, 1978, respondent Leo Snow's employee,
Guy Whiting, attempted to remove hay from appellants'
hay ground and was given a ticket for trespassing
on appellants' lands by Sheriff Murray (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 91-92).
On July 31, 1978, respondent

~eo

Snow permitted

57 head of his cattle to trespass upon the 5 acre
parcel of land surrounding appellant Clifton J. Hackford's
home and to destroy appellant Hackford's vegetable
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garden (Vol. I, pp. 19-93).
investigated the incident.

Sheriff Kenneth P. Pickup
Although another man whose

cattle had also trampled the garden, offered to pay
appellant Clifton J. Hackford for the damage, respondent
Leo Snow did not (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 169-175, 203-205).
Leo snow represented to Sheriff Pickup on that occasion
that he owned the 5 acre parcel surrounding appellant
Clifton J. Hackford's home (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 218-219)
although

responden~s'

counsel, at trial, represented

that respondents claimed no interest therein (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 26).
On August 2, 1978, respondent Leo Snow shot
the lock off the gate to the five acre parcel of land
surrounding the home of appellant Clifton J. Hackford
and cut and removed 722 bales of hay from the property
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 93, 176-182).
Throughout the trial of this action, over
the continuing objection of counsel for appellants,
the Court admitted parol evidence, in the form of
testimony from respondents, to establish which of
the lands comprising the Hackford farm were included
and excluded from the 420 acres subject to the Agreement
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 36, 37, 46, 56, 58, 146).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS
UNLAWFULLY DETAINED ON THE PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT AFTER RECIEVING NOTICE OF APPELLANTS' TERMINATION
OF THE AGREEMENT FOR RESPONDENTS'
BREACH THEREOF.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS' BREACHES
OF THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975, DID
NOT CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR APPELLANTS'
TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

"Except where there are special circumstances
which would render a forfeiture unconscionable, or where
the breach is trivial and not willful, the lessor
may terminate the lease, pursuant to a provision for
forfeiture therein, where the lessee does not fulfill
his covenant to pay taxes or other assessments on
the leased property."

51 C.J.S. 108.

This Court

expressed the identical view in Bacon v. Park, 57
P. 28 (Utah 1899), holding that:
Where due payment of taxes is one of
the covenants of a lease, and the
taxes are allowed to become delinquent
. . . (no demand is necessary) before
declaring a forfeiture . . • Equity
will not relieve against the forfeiture
of a lease for breach of a covenant
when the breach has been culpable,
long persisted in and detrimental.
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See also, Anno. 93 A.L.R. 1243.

The same result ob-

tained in Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, 381 P.2d
735, 736 (Utah 1963), in which this Court held that
the failure of a tenant to pay taxes and insurance
premiums she covanted to pay under a lease agreement
constituted a material breach of the lease for which
the lessor could terminate the lease.
This Court has also recognized that the forfeiture
of a lease is justified for the improper use, prohibited
transfer or neglect of the leasehold, Gerard v. Young,
432 P.2d 343 (1967), and neighboring courts have also
so held.

Bolon v. Pennington, 432 P.2d 274 (Arizona

1974); Freeman v. Rose, 188 N.W.2d 683 (Neb. 1971);
Eliason v. Eliason, 443 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1968); Bentler
v. Poulson, 141 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1966).
In Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d
889, 891 (Utah 1976), cert. den. 1976, this Court
held:
Parties are free to contract according
to their desires in whatever terms
they can agree upon and forfeiture
is to be allowed where the terms
of the agreement are clear.
Also, in Jacobsen v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah
1954), this Court noted that:
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It is only when the forfeiture would
be so grossly excessive as to be entirely dispoportionate to any possible
loss that might have been contemplated,
so that to enforce it would shock
the conscience, that a court of
equity will refuse to enforce the
provision.
In the instant case, the evidence is uncontroverted that respondents covenanted under the Agreement
of April, 1975, to pay all property taxes and assessments
and to maintain the fences and water system on the
property subject of the Agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibits
1 and 4, lines 25-27).

The Agreement contains an

unequivocal forf ei tur.e provision for the breach of
these covenants, providing that:
In the event the tenant fails to
execute said lease as herein provided,
the amounts paid hereon shall, at the
option of the landlord, be retained
as liquidated and agreed damges, or
landlord may _elect to retain said sum
and to require specific performance.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 and 4, lines 39-40).
It is uncontested that from the inception
of the Agreement of April, 1975, respondents failed
to make timely water assessment and property tax payments
and that this continued throughout 1975, 1976 and
1977 to the extent that the property taxes for 19
were advertised as delinquent in a local newspaper
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and appellants were given notice that they would lose
their irrigation rights for the 1977 season unless
the assessments were paid, at which point appellants
were forced to pay the assessments (Supra, pp. 10-16).
Likewise, the respondents did not contest that they
failed to maintain the ditches and water system on
the property subject to the Agreement in the fall
of 1976, with the result that in the spring of 1977,
the water ran over the filled ditches and created
substantial damage in the form of washouts and gullies
to appellants' property (Supra, pp. 12 - 16).

The

evidence adduced at trial also shows that appellants
continually notified respondents of their breaches
of the Agreement and respondents repeatedly pledged
to cure their breaches but failed to do so (Supra,
pp. 10 - 16

The evidence shows that respondents'

breaches of the Agreement of April, 1975, were "culpable,
long persisted in and detrimental."

They were breaches

of the nature which this Court has consistently held
to constitute justification for the termination of
a lease agreement.

Therefore, appellants submit that

the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that
such breaches did not constitute grounds for appellants'
termination of the lease Agreement of April, 1975.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS COULD NOT
TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975,
EXCEPT BY INSTITUTING AN ACTION AGAINST
RESPONDENTS FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court
held that:
. . . The letter of July 7, sent by
defendants' (appellants herein) counsel
to plaintiffs did not terminate the
lease, and so holds. The Earnest Money
Agreement contained no provisions for
termination of the lease for violation
of its terms and the proper procedure
for termination was under the Forcible
Entry and Detainer statutes of the State
of Utah.
(R. 209-210).
Although at common law lease agreements were
almost always terminated by the terms of the lease,
today a lease may also be terminated by the operation
of law.

This means that although there is no specific

provision in the lease allowing termination, the law
will consider the lease at an end by looking at the
intent and cci:ions of the parties.

Such termination

often takes the form of terminations for reasons of
frustration, surrender, or forfeiture.

B.Y.U., Summary

of Utah Property Law, Vol. 2, p. 572 (1978).

The

decisions of this Court are uniform in holding that
the lessee's breach of covenants to pay taxes and

-26-
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assessments, or breach of any covenant which results
in the misuse or damage of the leasehold, constitutes
grounds for the termination of a lease by operation
of law.

Bacon v. Park, supra; Russell v. Park City

Utah Corp., supra; Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments,
supra; Gerald v. Young, supra.
Assuming then, that respondents' breaches
of the Agreement of April, 1975, did constitute sufficient
grounds for appellants to declare the termination
and forfeiture thereof pursuant to law (See, Argument,
Point I

(A), supra), appellants submit that they could

enforce the termination of the Agreement simply by
giving proper notice thereof, and that they would
not, contrary to the trial court's decision, be forced
to initiate an action for unlawful detainer to terminate
the Agreement, although appellants might be required
to initiate such action in order to regain possession.
In Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, supra,
the lessor, after the lessee had failed to pay taxes
and insurance premiums on the leased premises in accordance with her covenants in the lease agreement, declared
a termination of the Agreement and declared the termination of the agreement in a letter to the lessee.
The trial court held that the "letter of March 24,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1960 terminated the lease" and this Court upheld that
determination, noting that the lessor therein properly
initiated an action for unlawful detainer to regain
possession of the leased premises when the lessee
refused to relinquish the premises.
In the case at bar, the evidence is uncontested
that appellant Clifton J. Hackford telephoned respondent
Leo Snow in May, 1977, and informed him of appellants'
intention to terminate the Agreemer.t of April, 1977,
and that appellants later had Albert Colton, an attorney
in Vernal, Utah, send a letter to respondents formally
informing them of the termination of the lease and
detailing respondents' breaches thereof.
pp. 13 - ls).

(See supra,

Appellants submit that these actions

provided respondents with all the notice of their
default and breech of the Agreement of April, 1975,
and appellants' action in terminating the Agreement
required by law.

See generally, Day v. Smith, 30

P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo. 1934); Independence Flying Service
Inc. v. Abitz, 386 S.W. 2d 399, 404 (Mo. 1965); Moore
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 377 P.2d 32, 35 (Ore. 1962).
When respondents refused to vacate the premises subject
of the Agreement of April, 1975, the evidence is clear
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that appellants did institute an action for unlawful
detainer to regain possession of their land, but this
action was not for the purpose of terminating the
lease or required for termination of the Agreement
of ·April, 1975 (See supra, pp.

15 - 16

).

The decisional

law contained in the Annotations to the Utah Focible
Entry and Detainer statutes, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-2
(1953 as amended), pp. 436, 439, is uniform in holding

that an action for unlawful detainer is instituted
for the purpose of "regaining possession" and is not
necessary to the termination of the lease agreement.
Based upon the foregoing, appellants respectfully
submit that the trial court erred in holding that
appellants could not effectively terminate the Agreement
of April, 1975, except by resorting to an action against
respondents for unlawful detainer.

-29-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE OPTION TO PURCHASE CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975.
A.

APPELLANTS' TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975, ALSO TERMINATED
RESPONDENTS' OPTION TO PURCHASE CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT.

Under Utah law, the termination of a lease
agreement containing an option to purchase also terminates
the option, if the lease and option covenants are
entirely interdependent and indivisable.

In Russell

v. Park City Corp., supra, this court held that a
right of purchase granted the lessee under the lease
agreement fell with the lease upon its termination.
In that

c~se,

the lessee disputed the termination

and also argued that the right to purchase the leased
property contained in the lease agreement survived
the termination of the lease.

This Court, in denying

the lessee's contention, applied the following rule:
If by the express terms of the option,
it can be seen as independent of the
other covenants of the lease, and is
supported by valid consideration, it
can continue in existence notwithstanding
the lease's termination.
(Emphasis Supplied)
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This Court affirmed the finding of the lower court
that no separate consideration supported the option,
and that the option therefore ceased to exist at the
time the lease agreement was terminated.
In Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, supra,
at 736, this Court held that the trial court acted
properly in declining to grant specific performance
of an option contained in a lease agreement where
the lessee did not attempt to exercise the option
prior to the lessor's termination of the lease agreement.
In the case at bar, the Agreement of April, 1975,
shows that respondents gave no separate consideration
for the option to purchase contained in the Agreement,
and that appellants formally notified respondents
of the termination of the Agreement and Option by
the letter dated July 7, 1977 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits
1 and 4; supra,

p.

Thereafter, respondents

16).

notified appellants of their desire to exercise the
option and to reimburse appellants for the water assessment payments which appellants were forced to pay
in order to protect their irrigation rights after
respondents' default in making the payments (Supra,
pp.

15 - 17).

Appellants did not accept these or
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or any other proposed payments from respondents subsequent to their termination of the Agreement and option
(Id. ) .

Since the Agreement of

April~

1975, and the

option to purchase contained therein were

completely

dependent and interrelated and not supported by separate
consideration, appellants submit that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to find that appellants'
termination of the Agreement also terminated the option
contained therein.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS WERE
ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE CONTAINED IN
THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975, WHEN
RESPONDENTS WERE IN BREACH OF THE
AGREEMENT AT THE TIME THEY ATTEMPTED
TO EXERCISE THE OPTION.

Several courts have held that where lease
and option provisions
tute

are not independent, but consti-

parts of one entire contract, that the breach

of the lease amounts

to a failure of consideration

for the accompanying option to purchase, such that
the option

is lost, the consideration for the option

being the fulfillment of the covenants of the lease
agreement.

Annotation, 115 A.L.R. 376.

-32Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Thus, in Russell v. Park City Utah Corp.,
supra, this Court observed that an option contained
in a lease agreement is only enforceable after the
termination of the lease agreement if the option agreement is either separate from the lease or severable
from the lease.

In Shoemaker v. Pioner Investments,

supra, this Court declined to order specific performance
of an option to purchase property subject to a lease
.agreement where the lease agreement had been terminated
by the lessor for the lessee's nonpayment of taxes
and insurance premiums.
In the instant case, the evidence demonstrates
beyond peradventure that respondents were in breach
of the lease Agreement of April, 1975, at the time
appellants terminated the Agreement for respondents'
nonpayment of property taxes and water assessments,
and respondents' failure to maintain water systems
on the property which resulted in severe damage to
the land, and that appellants' termination of Agreement
was due to this conduct on the part of respondents
(Supra,

10-16

).

The letter formally notifying

respondents of the termination of the Agreement sets
forth the nature of respondents' breaches thereof
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in detail (Defendants' Exh. 17) and respondents
did not actually tender performance of the option
until March, 1978 (R.

76-79).

Since the option and Agreement of April, 1975,
were not separate or independent and respondents were
in breach of the Agreement at the time they attempted
to exercise the option to purchase the property subject
to the Agreement, the trial court erred in ruling
that respondents were entitled to specific performance
of the option to purchase.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN HOLDING THAT THE LAND SUBJECT TO
THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975, WAS
DESCRIBED WITH SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY
TO JUSTIFY THE COURT IN AWARDING
RESPONDENTS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY
CONTAINED THEREIN.

In Davidson v. Robbins, 517 P.2d 1026 (Utah
1973), this Court held that a real estate contract
is not valid unless the land subject to the contract
is clearly and unarnbigously described.

This Court

further held that parole evidence was only admissible
to apply, not supply the description of land in a
contract.

In that regard, this Court observed:
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Parole evidence will not be admitted
to complete a defective description,
or to show the intention with which
it was made.
Parole evidence may be
used for the purpose of identifying
the description contained in the
writing with its locations upon the
ground, but not for the purpose of
ascertaining and locating the land
about which the parties negotiated,
and that of supplying and adding to
a description insufficient and void
on its face.
Appellants submit that the instant case is
governed by Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (1967).
In that case, this Court held that a real estate contract
which did not provide with certaintly which 30 acres
of the plaintiffs' 189 acre tract were to be conveyed
to the defendants, could not support a decree of specific
performance because the description of the land in
the contract was deemed to be too indefinite.
As in Lauritzen, the evidence shows that appellants
and respondents did not provide with any certainty
which 420 acres of appellants' 445 acres were subject
to the parties' Agreement of April, 1975 (Plaintiffs'
Exhibits 1 and 4).

The trial court, over appellants'

objection, permitted respondents to offer parole evidence
consisting of respondents' testimony as to where the
420 acres subject to the contract was located, and
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where the 25 acres not subject to the contract was
located (Supra, p. 21).

Appellants testified that

the 25 acres not subject to the Agreement of April,
1975, were located in one area of the property and
respondents testified that these same lands were located
in a different place than appellants maintained.
The evidence demonstrates that both appellants and
respondents conducted activities on the sections of
the Hackford farm claimed to be "included" and "excluded"
from the Agreement according to the conflicting testimony
of appellants and respondents, and that each party
continued to claim different acreage was "included"
or "excluded" from the Agreement, after the parties
filed their separate actions in the district court
and throughout the trial of the parties' consolidated
actions (Supra, pp. 10-25).

On similar facts, this

Court refused to compel specific performance in Lauritzen.
Respondents have argued that Brady v. Fausett,
546 P.2d 246 (Utah 1976) is dispositive of this issue.
Since counsel for respondents argued that case before
this Court, they should be informed that Brady is
readily distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Brady, this Court held that a contract
for the lease of land containing an option for purchase
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was unenforceable on the theory of lack of specificity
in the description of the land in the lease agreement
where:
the vendor prepared the contract and
agreed to supply a description from
documents at his disposal and in view
of defendants' occupancy, operation
and improvement of the properties.
In this case, 11one of the factors critical to the
Brady decision are present.
First, in the instant case, the evidence indicates
that appellants did not prepare the lease agreement.
It is uncontroverted that the Agreement was prepared
and drafted by one Sherman Culp, at the request of
respondent Corwin Barton Snow (Supra, p. 3).
Second, the appellants did not agree in the
Agreement of April, 1975, to supply any further description of the leased premises from documents in their
possession, as did the lessors in Brady.
Third, unlike the lessors in Brady, appellants
did not accept any payments from the respondents after
appellants served notice upon respondents that the
lease and option Agreement was terminated for respondents'
breach thereof.
Fourth, even if a description of the property
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could be surmised from the parties' respective activities
on the· lands deemed to be "included" or "excluded"
from coverage by the Agreement of the parties, the
evidence demonstrates that appellants' activities
on the 20 acres appellants claim to have retained
as their hay ground was far greater than that of respondents.
In conclusion, appellants submit that this
Court has not either.implicitly or explicitly overruled
its decision in Lauritzen by its pronouncements in
Brady.

As this Court noted in Lauritzen:
A greater degree of certainty is
required for specific performance
in equity than is necessary to
establish a contract as the basis
of an action at law for damages.
18 ut. 2d 368, 372.
Based upon the foregoing,

it was error for

the trial court to hold that the description of the
properties covered by the Agreement of April, 1975,
was sufficient to support an award of specific performance, and the Court also erred in admitting parole
evidence for the purpose of supplying an adequate
description in the lease where none existed.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the findings and
judgment of the lower court, and specifically, to
find and declare that appellants are entitled to judgment against respondents for their unlawful detainer
upon appellants' lands, and respondents are not entitled
to a judgment for specific performance of the lease
and option agreement of the parties, and to assess
damages and costs against respondents according to
the

1.
of November, 1980.
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